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Abstract
This paper addresses detection of a reverse engineering (RE) attack tar-
geting a deep neural network (DNN) image classifier; by querying, RE’s aim
is to discover the classifier’s decision rule. RE can enable test-time evasion
attacks, which require knowledge of the classifier. Recently, we proposed a
quite effective approach (ADA) to detect test-time evasion attacks. In this
paper, we extend ADA to detect RE attacks (ADA-RE). We demonstrate
our method is successful in detecting “stealthy” RE attacks before they
learn enough to launch effective test-time evasion attacks.
1 Introduction
Recently, there has been great interest in identifying vulnerabilities in machine
learning (ML)) systems. Test-time evasion attacks (TTEAs) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] add
subtle perturbations to legitimate test-time samples1 to “fool” a classifier into
making incorrect decisions relative to those of a human being. Related work has
demonstrated the fragility of DNNs for some domains in the presence of modest
data perturbations, e.g. changing the tempo in music genre classification [12].
TTEAs should be taken seriously because they could allow illegitimate access to a
building, data, or a piece of machinery. They could also lead e.g. to a radiologist
looking at “doctored” cancer biopsy images (that trick automated pre-screening
systems). Test-time attacks require knowledge of the classifier under attack. RE
∗This paper is dedicated to the memory of our dear friend Jan Larsen. This research is
supported by AFOSR DDDAS and Cisco Systems URP.
1Perturbation approaches are related to boundary-finding algorithms (neural network inver-
sion) [7].
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attacks [8, 9] involve querying a classifier to discover its decision rule. Thus, one
primary application of RE is to enable TTEAs.
Several recent RE attack works are [8] and [9]. [8] demonstrates that, with a
relatively modest number of queries (perhaps∼ ten thousand), using the classifier’s
answers on query examples as supervising ground truth labels, one can learn a sur-
rogate classifier on a given domain that closely mimics an unknown (black box)
classifier. One weakness of [8] is that it neither considers very large (feature space)
domains nor very large networks (DNNs) – orders of magnitude more queries may
be needed to reverse-engineer a DNN on a large-scale domain. However, a much
more critical weakness stems from one of the greatest purported advantages in
[8] – the authors emphasize their RE does not require any actual samples from
the domain2. Their queries are randomly drawn, e.g. uniformly, over the given
feature space. What was not recognized in [8] is that this random querying makes
the attack easily detectable – randomly selected query patterns will typically look
nothing like legitimate examples from any of the classes – they are very likely to
be extreme outliers, of all the classes. Each such query is thus individually highly
suspicious – thus, even ten, let alone ten thousand such queries will be trivially
anomaly-detected as jointly improbable under a null distribution (estimable from
the training set defined over all the classes from the domain). Even if the attacker
employed bots, each of which makes a small number of queries, each bot’s random
queries should be easily detected as anomalous, likely associated with an RE at-
tack. On the other hand, [9] propose an RE attack that does require some initial
known data from the domain. It uses this to create more legitimate, “stealthier”
queries, over a series of query stages, with the resulting labeled data used to train
a substitute classifier used to launch a TTEA.
Recently, an approach was developed which achieves state-of-the-art results
in detection of TTEAs, Anomaly Detection of Attacks (ADA) [5, 6]. Since this
approach is an anomaly detector for the image domain of interest, it in principle
should also be applicable to detect query images that are not representative of
real images from the domain. However, since the querying in [9] is stealthy (as
it is based on perturbations of real images from the domain), it is not obvious
their querying is detectable. However, here we extend ADA to indeed detect the
RE querying from [9], and thus demonstrate the potential to prevent TTEAs even
before they are launched.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we describe the reverse engineer-
ing attack of [11]. In Sec. 3, we give background on ADA. In Sec. 4, we discuss
our extension of ADA for reverse engineering attacks. Experimental results for
DNN classifiers of images are given in Sec. 5. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Sec. 6.
2For certain sensitive domains, or ones where obtaining real examples is expensive, the at-
tacker may not have access to legitimate examples.
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2 RE Attack Given Domain Samples
The RE procedure in [9] is summarized as follows. First, the adversary collects
a small set of representative labeled samples from the input domain as an initial
training set S0 and uses this to train an initial substitute classifier. Then, there
is stagewise data collection and retraining, over a sequence of stages. In each, the
adversary augments the current training set by querying the classifier with the
stage’s newly generated samples [9], i.e.,
Sk+1 = {x+ λ · sgn(O(maxcP (k)s [C = c|x])) : x ∈ Sk} ∪ Sk
where k is the current stage index and P
(k)
s [C = c|x] is the current substitute class
posterior model. The substitute classifier is then retrained using Sk+1. Each suc-
cessive stage crafts query samples closer to the classifier’s true boundary, which is
helpful for RE learning but which also makes these samples less class-representative
and thus more detectable. Once a sufficiently accurate substitute classifier is
learned, the adversary can launch a TTEA using one of the existing TTEA at-
tacks, e.g. [2, 1, 3]. Here, one starts with an original image from the domain, from
a source class cs, perturbs the image, using the substitute classifier’s gradient in-
formation, to push across the decision boundary to a destination class, cd 6= cs.
The perturbed image is then submitted to the actual classifier as a TTEA instance.
3 Detection of Test-Time Evasions (ADA)
3.1 Basic ADA
ADA detection is grounded in the premise that an attack example in general will
exhibit too much atypicality (evaluated on null distributions estimated from the
class training sets) w.r.t. cd and too little null atypicality w.r.t. cs
3. Given a test
sample x, basic ADA works as follows:
1. Determine the MAP (destination) class under the deep neural network: cd =
argmaxcP [C = c|x].
2. Compute z = g
k
(x), the vector of outputs from the k-th layer of the DNN.
3. Estimate the source class cs based on the null model: cs = argmaxc 6=cdfZ(k)|c(z).
4. Form two probability vectors P (k) andQ(k) where P (k) = {p0fZ(k)|cd(z), p0fZ(k)|cs(z)}
and Q(k) = {q0P [C = cd|x], q0P [C = cs|x]}. p0 and q0 are normalizers to
make P (k) and Q(k) probability mass functions.
5. Report a detection if DKL(P (k)||Q(k)) > t where DKL(·||·) is the Kullback
Leibler (KL) Divergence.
The KL distance will be large when x exhibits atypicality w.r.t. the null of cd and
typicality w.r.t. the null of cs.
3This premise is plausible because the attacker tries to be stealthy – to fool the classifier
while not fooling a human being (or an anomaly detector). In so doing, the perturbed image,
while classified to cd, still has to “look” like it comes from cs.
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3.2 Ultimate ADA Method Development: L-AWA-maxKL
The ultimate ADA method is based on the following extensions/improvements.
Maximizing KL distance over multiple layers: Rather than measure KL
distance at one layer, we can compute KL distance at different layers and detect
based on the maximum KL distance over these layers.
Null modelling for Different Neuron Activations: It was demonstrated
that Gaussian mixture modelling is suitable for sigmoidal and linear layers, with
log-Gaussian mixture modelling appropriate for RELU layers[5, 6].
Exploiting source class uncertainty and class confusion: Basic ADA hard-
estimates cs. More information is preserved if one reflects source class uncertainty,
via the probabilities
P[Cs = c] =
fZ|c(z)∑
c′ 6=cd fZ|c′(z)
∀c 6= cd.
Going further, if we have knowledge of the class confusion matrix [P[C∗ = i|C =
j]], then a tuple (cs, cd) with a small class confusion probability P[C
∗ = cd|C = cs]
may indicate an attack. As a result, we weight KL distance by 1
P[cd|cs] . This
increases the decision statistic for those pairs that are unlikely to occur. Combining
both techniques, we construct an average weighted ADA decision statistic via∑
c 6=cd
P[C = c]
DKL(P
(c)||Q(c))
P[C∗ = cd|C = c] .
We can evaluate this statistic at different layers and then apply a max rule over
the layers.
Exploiting local features: Rather than jointly null-model all features from a
layer, instead we can null-model all possible feature pairs within this layer. This
accounts for possible sparsity of an attack’s anomalous signature within a layer4.
For layer l with N features, there are Nl =
(
N
2
)
feature pairs. For each, denoted
(Zi, Zj)(ith and jth features from layer l), we can evaluate average weighted ADA
statistics. Moreover, each of these low-order AW-ADA statistics can be weighted
by the magnitude of the DNN weights from Zi and Zj to the next layer of the DNN.
The DNN weightings are properly normalized and denoted βi and βj. The feature
pairs with higher βi and βj have a stronger impact in classifier decision-making
and thus atypicalities involving them should be given greater weight. Accordingly,
for each layer we form a weighted aggregation of all low-order AW-ADA statistics,
expressed for layer l as L-AWA-ADA(l):
1
Nl
∑
(i,j)
βiβj
∑
c6=cd
Pij[C = c]
DKL(P
(c)
ij ||Q(c))
P[C∗ = cd|C = c] .
4Joint atypicality of all features in a layer may be weak if only a few features exhibit strong
atypicality.
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Here Pij and P
(c)
ij are feature-pair dependent since they are calculated using null
density modelling f(·), which is feature-pair dependent.βi is the sum of the mag-
nitudes of the DNN weights that conduct from feature i in layer l to all neurons in
the next layer, l+1, normalized by the maximum such sum over all features in layer
l. 1/Nl is a necessary normalizer to compare distance statistics across layers fairly,
since different layers have different numbers of feautures (neurons). Again we ap-
ply a max-KL rule on L-AWA-ADA(l) statistics, with the resulting method dubbed
L-AWA-ADA-maxKL. This is the ultimate ADA detection method (achieving the
best results), described in more detail in [5, 6].
4 Proposed Detection Approach for Reverse En-
gineering Attacks
Since in RE attacks the attacker submits batches of query images to the classi-
fier, we modify L-AWA to jointly exploit batches of images in seeking to detect
attacks (in this case RE query attacks, not TTEA attacks). Several schemes for
aggregating L-AWA-ADA decision statistics, produced for individual images in a
batch, are investigated:
i) arithmetically averaging the L-AWA statistic over all images in a batch;
ii) maximizing the L-AWA statistic over all images in a batch;
iii) Dividing a batch into mini-batches, for example a batch of 50 images could
be divided into mini-batches of size 5. For each mini-batch, apply either
scheme i) or ii). Then, make a detection if any of the mini-batches yields a
detection statistic greater than the threshold (union rule).
This last scheme will be seen to perform the best.
5 Experimental Setup and Results
We experimented on MNIST [10]. This is a dataset with 60,000 grayscale images,
representing the digits ‘0’ through ‘9’. There are 50,000 training images and 10,000
test images. As a DNN classifier, we used Lenet-5 [11]. We also used the Lenet-
5 structure for training the RE attacker’s substitute network. For S0 we used
150 MNIST samples (15 from each class). We applied 5 stages of retraining (6
training stages) of the substitute DNN and chose λ = 0.1. The number of queries
generated by the 5 stages were: 150, 300, 600, 1200 and 2400. Fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) is used to craft adversarial samples. We used mini-batches of size
5 in experiments. Two maxpooling layers and the penultimate layer were used in
generating the ADA detection statistics.For evaluating RE detections ROC-AUC,
we used two data sources: the 10,000 (non-query) test images and the query images
produced in a given stage. For a given batch size, to crate a pool of samples used
for evaluating ROC-AUC, we randomly drew batches from the two sources many
times with replacement. The number of samples created was batch-size dependent.
5
As one example for batch size 20, we created 427 non-query batches (samples) and
361 query batches (samples). We evaluated detection accuracy for stages 4-6 in
Figure 1: RE detection ROC AUC at different stages versus batch size for arith-
metic averaging scheme.
our experiments. The reason is as follows: the substitute classifier’s accuracy and
the resulting success rate of TTEA attacks both grow with the stage number;
by stage 4, these accuracies are 0.69 and 0.8, respectively, as shown in Figure
3. Figure 1 shows that good detection accuracy is achieved using the arithmetic
averaging scheme, with the ROC AUC increasing with batch size and with the
attack stage, as expected (slightly inferior performance is achieved by max rule).
However, the ROC AUC appears to asymptote at about 0.95, which we would
not expect – we would hope perfect detection accuracy could be approached with
increasing batch size, especially in the latter stages. This better behaviour is
exhibited by the mini-batch scheme with union detection rule in Figure 2. Thus,
this latter aggregation scheme is the most promising one.
6 Conclusion
We have developed an anomaly detection scheme that is very effective at detecting
“stealthy” RE attacks on DNN image classifiers. This is potentially important to
protect black box classifier information and to prevent TTEAs. Detection of other
types of attacks, for other application domains, may be considered in future.
6
Figure 2: RE detection ROC AUC at different stages versus batch size for mini-
batch union aggregation scheme.
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